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ABSTRACT: Working within the broad lines of general consensus that mark out the core features of John 
Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) logic, as set forth in his A System of Logic (1843–1872), this chapter provides an 
introduction to Mill’s logical theory by reviewing his position on the relationship between induction and 
deduction, and the role of general premises and principles in reasoning. Locating induction, understood as a 
kind of analogical reasoning from particulars to particulars, as the basic form of inference that is both free-
standing and the sole load-bearing structure in Mill’s logic, the foundations of Mill’s logical system are 
briefly inspected. Several naturalistic features are identified, including its subject matter, human reasoning, 
its empiricism, which requires that only particular, experiential claims can function as basic reasons, and its 
ultimate foundations in ‘spontaneous’ inference. The chapter concludes by comparing Mill’s naturalized 
logic to Russell’s (1907) regressive method for identifying the premises of mathematics. 
 
 
 
1 The Nature of Logic 
 
1.1 Reasoning: the Subject Matter of Logic 
 
Logic, for Mill, is the science and art of reasoning “meaning by the former term, the 
analysis of the mental process which takes place whenever we reason, and by the latter, 
the rules, grounded on that analysis, for conducting the process correctly” (Logic, VII: 4). 
Mill’s naturalization of logic begins by naturalizing its subject matter: logic studies 
mental, i.e., natural, processes. 
Yet while logic studies reasoning as a natural process, it does so normatively, not 
descriptively: it “takes cognizance of our intellectual operations, only as they conduce to 
our own knowledge” (Logic, VII: 6; cf. 12). 
 
Logic is not the science of Belief, but the science of Proof, or Evidence. In so far as 
belief professes to be founded on proof, the office of logic is to supply a test for 
ascertaining whether or not the belief is well grounded. (Logic, VII: 9) 
 
Logic, as an art, is prescriptive, and hence logic is not fully naturalized. That logic studies 
natural processes does not commit Mill to a naturalistic account of logical norms. This, as 
we will see, comes later. 
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Nevertheless, even here Mill’s position is a site of controversy. To appreciate this, 
consider an alternative, Fregean view. For Frege laws of logic “[are] not psychological 
laws of takings-to-be-true, but laws of truth” (1964: 13), and “[a] derivation from these 
[psychological] laws [of taking-to-be-true], an explanation of a mental process that ends 
in taking something to be true, can never take the place of proving what is taken to be 
true” (1977: 2), since “being true is different from being taken to be true, whether by one 
or many or everybody, and in no case is to be reduced to it. There is no contradiction in 
something’s being true which everybody takes to be false” (1964: 13; cf. 1979: 146, 
1980: vi). Reasons like these led Frege to de-naturalize the subject matter of logic, 
postulating a “third realm” (1977: 17) of sempiternal, insensible thoughts – truth-bearers 
or the senses of declarative sentences – for which all psychological properties, such as 
their being grasped by a mind, are accidental. For Frege, by mistakenly taking logic to be 
about thinking rather than thought, Mill’s logic mistakenly supplies laws of takings-to-
be-true rather than laws of truth (see Godden 2005, 2014). 
 
1.2 Logic as Philosophy of Evidence 
 
Yet for Mill, it is vital that logic be about thinking and supply laws of takings-to-be-true, 
since “[t]he sole object of Logic is the guidance of one’s own thoughts” (Logic, VII: 6). 
Accordingly, logic supplies guidance norms and this requires its naturalization. 
On Mill’s view, reasoning and consciousness comprise the two sources of all our 
knowledge (Logic, VII: 6–7). Truths of which we are directly conscious provide “the 
original data, or ultimate premises of our knowledge,” but are “known antecedently to all 
reasoning;” hence “[t]here is no logic for this portion of our knowledge” (Logic, VII: 7). 
Mill thus restricted “[t]he province of logic … to that portion of our knowledge which 
consists of inferences from truths previously known” (Logic, VII: 9). 
The study of reasoning, though, is not limited to demonstrative, or deductive, 
reasoning (which Mill called “ratiocination”). Rather logic studies all inferential means to 
knowledge. “Logic, as I conceive of it, is the entire theory of the ascertainment of 
reasoned or inferred truth” (Logic, VII: 206). For Mill, logic is a “Philosophy of 
Evidence” (Examination, IX: 371): a logic not of consistency, the property preserved 
through deductive validity, but of truth (Logic, VII: 208).  
A logic of truth, for Mill, involves real rather than verbal propositions (Logic, VII: 
109ff.), and real rather than verbal inferences (Logic, VII: 158ff.) Verbal propositions are 
distinguished by Skorupski’s (1989: 79) criterion of connotative inclusion whereby “the 
attributes connoted by the predicate are a subset of the attributes connoted by the 
subject.” Real propositions, by contrast, are synthetic and thereby capable of conveying 
new information about their subjects (Logic, VII: 116). Similarly, real inferences are 
ampliative – their conclusions assert more information than what is contained in their 
premises. Thus for Mill, real inferences, “in which we set out from known truths, to 
arrive at others really distinct from them,” are alone capable of advancing knowledge 
(Logic, VII: 158ff., 162). Hence, if logic is to have an epistemic function, it must move 
via real inferences from premises to conclusions each expressing real propositions. As we 
will see below, on Mill’s view, only induction is capable of producing such results. 
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2 Deduction 
 
2.1 Syllogisms and Real Inferences 
To understand Mill’s reasons here, it is instructive to consider his treatment of an 
illustrative, example syllogism. 
 
All men are mortal, 
The Duke of Wellington is a man, 
Therefore, the Duke of Wellington is mortal. (Logic, VII: 185) 
 
As an aside, Mill held that all valid deductions could be represented syllogistically and 
that all valid syllogisms could, by means of merely verbal transformations of their 
constituent claims, be represented in one of the four moods of the first figure: affirmative 
syllogisms as either Barbara or Darii, and negative syllogisms as either Celarent or 
Ferio (Logic, VII: 168). He was wrong on both counts.1 
                                                
1 On the second point, as Skorupski (1989: 103) observes, some transformations require a reductio proof, 
and hence appeal to the principle of non-contradiction which, according to Mill, is a real proposition. 
Perhaps more seriously, it was known at least from the time of Leibniz (1646–1716) that valid 
inferences can have non-syllogistic forms. In his New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Leibniz 
wrote: 
 
It should also be realized that there are valid non-syllogistic inferences which cannot be rigorously 
demonstrated in any syllogism unless the terms are changed a little, and this altering of the terms is the 
non-syllogistic inference. There are several of these, including arguments from the direct to the oblique 
– e.g. ‘If Jesus Christ is God, then the mother of Jesus Christ is the mother of God’. And again, the 
argument-form which some good logicians have called relation-conversion, as illustrated by the 
inference: ‘If David is the father of Solomon, then certainly Solomon is the son of David’. (Leibniz 
1996: 479f.; as quoted in Hodges 2009: 596) 
 
In Mill’s own time, several such developments were under discussion, some of which Mill was aware of 
(Logic, VII: 171 ff.; Examination, IX: ch.22). For example, Hamilton had proposed quantifying both the 
predicate and subject of syllogistic claims, while DeMorgan had discovered a ‘statistical’ syllogism which 
Mill described as follows: 
 
DeMorgan observes, [Formal Logic, 1847: 139,] very justly, that from the premises Most Bs are Cs, 
most Bs are As, it may be concluded with certainty that some As are Cs, since two portions of the class 
B, each of them comprising more than half, must necessarily in part consist of the same individuals. 
(Logic, VII: 171) 
 
DeMorgan also cited an example paralleling Leibniz’s: “man is an animal, therefore the head of a man is 
the head of an animal” (1847: 114). 
Mill’s response to these developments is both instructive and curious. He rejected their relevance to his 
project on two basic grounds. First, he claimed that these ‘expansions’ to syllogistic logic were not 
representative of our actual reasoning processes. 
 
Considered however as a contribution to the Science of Logic, that is, to the analysis of the mental 
processes concerned in reasoning, the new discipline appears to me, I confess, not merely superfluous, 
but erroneous; since the form in which it clothes propositions does not, like the ordinary form, express 
what is in the mind of the speaker when he enunciates the proposition. (Logic, VII: 173 fn) 
 
This response is curious since, as we will see, Mill denied that the syllogism has a representative function, 
insisting instead that its function is purely evaluative. 
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Given a syllogism such as this, the question for Mill is: in what manner is the 
inference demonstrative? How, and to what extent, do the premises support the 
conclusion? The problem, Mill recognized, is the following: 
 
the proposition [the Duke of Wellington is mortal] is presupposed by the more 
general assumption, All men are mortal: that we cannot be assured of the mortality of 
all men, unless we are already certain of the mortality of every individual man: that if 
it be still doubtful whether [the Duke of Wellington], or any other individual we 
choose to name, be mortal or not, the same degree of uncertainty must hang over the 
assertion, All men are mortal… (Logic, VII: 184; text adapted to fit example) 
 
Because of this, Mill concluded: “It must be granted that in every syllogism, considered 
as an argument to prove the conclusion, there is a petitio principii” (Logic, VII: 184; 
emphasis added). On Mill’s view, a syllogism cannot provide a reason for accepting its 
conclusion, since acceptance of the conclusion is already presupposed in the acceptability 
of the premises. As such, the general premises of syllogisms are not epistemically prior to 
their conclusions, and hence cannot provide a rational basis for the conclusion’s 
acceptability.2 
Accordingly, ratiocination is not a form of real inference: “no reasoning from 
generals to particulars can … prove anything: since from a general principle we cannot 
infer any particulars, but those which the principle itself assumes as known” (Logic, VII: 
184). This position leads Mill to several remarkable, indeed revolutionary, logical views: 
first on the inductive form and basis of all reasoning, second on the role of general claims 
in reasoning, and finally on the proper function of ratiocination. 
                                                                                                                                            
Second, Mill claimed that the new forms being proposed did not aid in the evaluation of reasoning.  
 
The sole purpose of any syllogistic forms is to afford an available test for the process of drawing 
inferences in the common language of life from premises in the same common language; and the 
ordinary forms of Syllogism effect this purpose completely. The new forms do not, in any appreciable 
degree, facilitate the process. … The new forms have thus no practical advantage which can 
countervail the objection of their entire psychological irrelevancy; and the invention and acquisition of 
them have little value. (Examination, IX: 403) 
 
This second reason is clearly false, since the expanded syllogistic systems formalize inferential structures 
that cannot properly be represented, and hence tested, in a classical syllogistic system. Indeed the kind of 
example given by Leibniz and DeMorgan requires a fully quantified predicate logic with identity in order 
that its validity be demonstrated. 
 
2 As Scarre (1989: 52–3) observes, Mill is mistaken on this key point, since there are clear cases where 
even an empiricist must admit that general claims are not known inductively. Scarre gives the following 
example: “All U.K. citizens over the age of 18 can vote in parliamentary elections. Jim is a U.K. citizen 
over the age of 18, therefore Jim can vote in parliamentary elections,” where the general premise is 
established by statute and known my reading the statute. While Mill is correct in saying that any doubt 
concerning the conclusion extends equally to the premise (perhaps we might wonder whether Jim can 
actually vote if his is not also a British resident, or if he is a member of the House of Lords, or if he is 
presently incarcerated), Mill is wrong to say that general claims cannot be epistemically prior to their 
conclusions and hence cannot act as reasons in argument. Insofar as there are legitimate means of knowing 
general claims other than by enumerative induction, e.g., by mathematical induction, ratiocinative inference 
can be real inference. 
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If not the premises of the syllogism, what, according to Mill, provides the real reason 
on the basis of which we accept its conclusion? 
 
The true reason why we believe that the Duke of Wellington will die, is that his 
fathers, and our fathers, and all other persons who were cotemporary with them, have 
died. Those facts are the real premises of the reasoning. (Logic, VII: 195) 
 
 
3 Empiricism in Logic 
 
3.1 Our Knowledge of General Truths 
 
Here we discover the second key component of Mill’s naturalization of logic: his 
empiricism. Mill found the rationalist view of intuitionist philosophers that substantive 
truths can be known a priori to be “the great intellectual support of false doctrines and 
bad institutions” (Autobiography, I: 233). Against this, Mill sided with the “School of 
Experience” which he described as follows: 
 
Of nature, or anything whatever external to ourselves, we know, according to this 
theory, nothing, except the facts which present themselves to our senses, and such 
other facts as may, by analogy, be inferred from these. There is no knowledge a 
priori; no truths cognizable by the mind’s inward light, and grounded on intuitive 
evidence. Sensation, and the mind’s consciousness of its own acts, are not only the 
exclusive sources, but the sole materials of our knowledge. (Coleridge, X: 125) 
 
Thus, considering the general proposition ‘all men are mortal,’ Mill asked, 
  
whence do we derive our knowledge of that general truth? Of course from 
observation. Now, all which man can observe are individual cases. From these all 
general truths must be drawn, and into these they may be again resolved. (Logic, VII: 
186) 
 
Because of its sources in experience, our knowledge occurs, and is acquired, first in 
individual cases. Only subsequently by means of inductive inference is this knowledge of 
particular instances collected and organized into generalizations. 
 
3.2 Induction as Real Inference 
 
The result is that induction is the sole form of real inference, and indeed the basis of all 
other inference. Since “all experience begins with individual cases, and proceeds from 
them to generals,” the fundamental, primary, and basic operation of inference cannot be 
deduction, or ratiocination, which Mill defined as “inferring a proposition from 
propositions equally or more general” (Logic, VII: 163, 162). Rather induction, “inferring 
a proposition from propositions less general than itself” (Logic, VII: 162) must be 
primary. Indeed induction, being the sole form of ampliative inference, is the sole form of 
real inference. 
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In every induction we proceed from truths which we knew, to truths which we did not 
know; from facts certified by observation, to facts which we have not observed, and 
even to facts not capable of being now observed; future facts, for example; but which 
we do not hesitate to believe on the sole evidence of the induction itself. (Logic, VII: 
163) 
 
 
4 Deduction Revisited 
 
4.1 The Function of General Claims and Principles in Inference 
 
Since they must be supported inductively, general claims do not have the inferential 
function they are typically taken to have. Generalizations, whether occurring as premises 
or as inferential principles, are not load-bearing structures in reasoning. Rather, they are 
inferentially inert. 
Consider again our example syllogism, and recall that for Mill our sole evidence 
supporting our belief in the conclusion is our prior experience of individual cases of 
human mortality. 
 
The mortality of John, Thomas, and others is, after all, the whole evidence we have 
for the mortality of the Duke of Wellington. Not one iota is added to the proof by 
interpolating a general proposition. Since the individual cases are all the evidence we 
can possess, evidence which no logical form into which we choose to throw it can 
make it greater than it is; and since that evidence is either sufficient in itself, or, if 
insufficient for the one purpose [i.e., of providing sufficient reason for the particular 
claim of the conclusion], [it] cannot be sufficient for the other [i.e., of providing 
sufficient reason for the general claim of the premise]; I am unable to see why we 
should be forbidden to take the shortest cut from these sufficient premises to the 
conclusions and constrained to travel the ‘high priori road’ by the arbitrary fiat of 
logicians. (Logic, VII: 187) 
 
For Mill, articulating our reasoning syllogistically, such that it passes through a general 
claim from which the conclusion logically follows, is not a means of adding to the 
evidence we have gleaned from experience. Instead, it is merely a means of referring to 
that evidence. When we conclude that 
 
the Duke of Wellington is mortal like the rest; we may, indeed, pass through the 
generalization, All men are mortal, as an intermediate stage; but it is not in the latter 
half of the process, the descent from all men to the Duke of Willington, that the 
inference resides. The inference is finished when we have asserted that all men are 
mortal. What remains to be performed afterwards is merely deciphering our own 
notes. (Logic VII, p. 187) 
 
General claims, on Mill’s account, do not, properly speaking, function as premises. 
Rather, Mill described their function variously as “memoranda” and as “registers of … 
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inferences already made” (Logic, VII: 194–5; 193), and explicitly denied them an 
evidentiary function: “when we conclude that the Duke of Wellington is mortal, we do 
not infer this from the memorandum, but from the former experience” (Logic, VII: 195).  
The role of general claims in inference is not evidential but notational: “a general truth is 
but an aggregate of particular truths; a comprehensive expression, by which an indefinite 
number of individual facts are affirmed or denied at once” (Logic, VII: 186). As such, 
while general claims are cognitively useful – Skorupski (1989: 115) describes them as 
functioning like currency in an economy: they are a store and measure of value, and a 
means of exchanging real goods – they are, nevertheless, inferentially inert. 
 
4.2 The Basic Axioms of Syllogistic Reasoning 
 
Mill’s position on the primacy of induction and the inferential inertness of general claims 
in reasoning extends also to the basic axioms or principles of deduction itself. 
Mill held that the fundamental principle of all ratiocination is the transitivity of 
coexistence, having two formulations corresponding to affirmative and negative 
syllogisms respectively (Logic, VII: 178). Importantly for Mill, these principles are not 
merely verbal (e.g., conceptual or definitional) but are real, universal laws of nature. 
 
These axioms manifestly relate to facts, and not to conventions; and one or the other 
of them is the ground of the legitimacy of every argument in which facts and not 
conventions are the matter treated of. (Logic, VII: 178) 
 
Yet while they mark the legitimacy of syllogistic inference, they do not have an 
evidentiary or warranting function. Instead they are, like any other general truth, 
supported by induction. As real propositions, they are known first in their particular 
instances and only subsequently is this evidence drawn together inductively to conclude 
the general axiom. 
Similarly, concerning the principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle as 
axioms of rationality or deduction, Mill wrote: 
 
I consider it [the law of non-contradiction] to be, like other axioms, one of our first 
and most familiar generalizations from experience. The original foundation of it I 
take to be, that belief and disbelief are two different mental states, excluding one 
another. (Logic, VII: 277) 
 
Because of this, the basic principles of ratiocination lack any argumentative role in 
deduction, even as second-order or meta-theoretic principles. Stating the principle “things 
which coexist with the same thing, coexist with one another” (Logic, VII: 178) together 
with the Duke of Wellington syllogism provides the conclusion with no additional 
evidence or warrant beyond the evidence of any particular cases supplied by experience. 
Thus the supposed axioms of ratiocination have the same function as any other 
general claim. First, as already mentioned, rather than function evidentially, they function 
as memoranda of the evidence collected in induction. 
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All inference is from particulars to particulars: General propositions are merely 
registers of such inferences already made, and short formulae for making more: The 
major premise of a syllogism, consequently, is a formula of this description: and the 
conclusion is not an inference drawn from the formula, but an inference drawn 
according to the formula: the real logical antecedent, or premise, being the particular 
facts from which the general proposition was collected by induction. (Logic, VII, p. 
193) 
 
Second, as will be discussed further below, rather than functioning as parts of arguments, 
providing reasons, or principles for reasons, from which conclusions may then be 
justifiably inferred, general claims and principles provide rules according to which 
inferences may be made, and against which the correctness of inferences may be 
checked. Importantly though, these rules do not act as inference licenses, authorizing the 
step from premises to conclusion, since the rule itself is inferentially inert. Rather than in 
the rule itself, the authorization for the inference is to be found in the evidence collected 
under the rule. 
 
4.3 The Proper Function of Ratiocination 
 
Given his picture of the role of general claims in reasoning, Mill must offer an alternative 
account of the proper function of the syllogism. On Mill’s account, syllogisms, and 
deduction generally, cannot function argumentatively: they cannot supply reasons on the 
basis of which the acceptability of their conclusions rest. Nor, according to Mill, is the 
syllogism representative of our actual reasoning processes. 
 
[T]hough there is always a process of reasoning or inference where a syllogism is 
used, the syllogism is not a correct analysis of that process of reasoning or inference; 
which is, on the contrary, (when not a mere inference from testimony) an inference 
from particulars to particulars. (Logic, VII: 196) 
 
Rather than having an argumentative or representative function, Mill claimed that the 
proper function of the syllogism is evaluative. 
 
[T]he syllogism is not the form in which we necessarily reason, but a test of 
reasoning: a form into which we may translate any reasoning, with the effect of 
exposing all the points at which any unwarranted inference can have got in. … [T]he 
syllogistic theory is only concerned with providing forms suitable to test the validity 
of inferences. (Examination, IX: 390; cf. Logic, VII: 198, 205) 
 
Together with the formulation of general premises or principles, syllogistic logic provides 
a mechanism to test the validity of our ordinary reasoning. If we can formulate our 
reasoning in one of the valid syllogistic forms, and if, having done so, we are prepared to 
admit the general premise(s) of the syllogism, then we may be assured of the 
acceptability of our conclusion – at least to the extent that we are justified in our 
willingness to admit the premises. Yet to reiterate, this operation is only a test, since the 
real argumentative work (both evidentiary and warranting) has been done inductively, in 
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amassing the evidence required to establish the general premises or principles in the first 
place. 
 
 
5 Induction 
 
5.1 Analogical Reasoning: The Basic Structure of Induction 
 
Induction, then, is the foundation of all inferential knowledge. Further, given that it 
provides the basis for all other forms of inference and inferential principles, Mill’s system 
requires that induction itself be self-supporting. What then is the structure of inductive 
reasoning, and how is it free-standing while being the sole load-bearing structure in 
Mill’s logic? 
Induction, for Mill, “consists in inferring from some individual instances in which a 
phenomenon is observed to occur, that it occurs in all instances … which resemble the 
former, in … the material circumstances” (Logic, VII: 306). Though induction includes 
both inductive generalization and induction to a particular, for Mill both the alpha and 
omega of induction, and hence of all reasoning, is reasoning from particulars to 
particulars (Logic, VII: 193). Indeed it is the first and most natural way in which we 
ordinarily reason. 
 
Not only may we reason from particulars to particulars without passing through 
generals, but we perpetually do so reason. All our earliest inferences are of this 
nature. … We all, where we have no definite maxims to steer by, guide ourselves in 
the same way. (Logic, VII: 188) 
 
The structure of reasoning from particulars from particulars is analogical (Logic, VII: 
202ff; cf. 554ff.): we pass from premises that note particular properties in observed cases 
to a conclusion that projects at least one of those properties onto unobserved cases 
resembling the former in respect of the other observed properties. Mill gave the following 
general formula for analogical reasoning: 
 
Form of Analogical Reasoning 
Two things resemble each other in one or more respects; 
a certain proposition is true of the one; 
therefore it is true of the other. (Logic, VII: 555) 
 
This formulation, he claimed, “will serve for all reasoning from experience … the 
strictest induction, equally with the faintest analogy” (Logic, VII: 555). Yet, clearly such 
inferences are not always successful: they do not always, or even generally, conduce to 
true conclusions even when their premises are true. The question for Mill, then, was what 
distinguishes the successful, cogent applications of analogical reasoning, which Mill 
identified with induction, from those that unreliably project similarities from premises to 
conclusions? 
 
5.2 Induction and Causal Laws of Nature 
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For Mill, the difference between successful induction and failed analogy is that in cases 
of induction our projection of properties tracks some causal law of nature: “every well-
grounded inductive generalization is either a law of nature, or a result of laws of nature, 
capable, if those laws are known, of being predicted from them” (Logic, VII: 318). When 
a property is reliably projected in induction, this reliability is explained by the fact that 
the principle at work in the inference corresponds to some actual regularity in the world – 
a law of nature. 
Thus, in order to know whether our inductions are warranted we must discover the 
laws of nature, or the actual regularities according to which the universe operates. 
(Importantly, for Mill “the expression, Laws of Nature, means nothing but the 
uniformities which exist among natural phenomena” which he claimed to be synonymous 
with “the results of induction” (Logic, VII: 318).) In this respect, the aims of inductive 
logic and natural science are the same. 
To achieve this end, Mill proposed a series of Baconian methods of experimental 
inquiry for “singling out from among the circumstances which precede or follow a 
phenomenon, those with which it is really connected by an invariable law” (Logic, VII: 
388ff.). These canons of induction prescribe sequences of controlled observations 
designed to isolate particular aspects of correlated phenomena and subsequently (i) to 
exclude them as not part of the cause, because they can be absent yet the same result 
obtain (method of agreement), or (ii) identify those aspects acting causally, because when 
they alone are absent the result fails to obtain (method of difference). (The remaining 
methods either combine or are built on the results of these.) 
Because successful, warranted inductions track laws of nature, whenever an 
indication to a particular is warranted, so too is an inductive generalization that states the 
relevant nomological regularity. 
 
If, from observation and experiment, we can conclude to one new case, so may we to 
an indefinite number. If that which has held true in our past experience will therefore 
hold in time to come, it will hold not merely in some individual case, but in all cases 
of some given description. Every induction, therefore, which suffices to prove one 
fact, proves an indefinite multitude of facts: the experience which justifies a single 
prediction must be as such to bear out a general theorem. (Logic, VII: 196) 
 
Mill’s thesis that successful inductions track natural laws is at the core of his dispute with 
Whewell (1794–1866) concerning the nature of induction. The question was whether 
induction involved the mind adding anything to what was given in experience. According 
to Whewell, induction involves a colligation of facts: a bringing together of particular 
facts under some general, uniting conception. This uniting conception, Whewell claimed, 
is not found among the facts, but is supplied by the mind. 
 
The facts are known, but they are insulated and unconnected, till the discoverer 
supplies from his own store a principle of connexion. The pearls are there, but they 
will not hang together till someone provides the string. (Whewell 1858: 73) 
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Against this Mill argued that, while the mind must conceive of this generalization for 
itself, when induction is rightly conducted it is because the generalization conceived in 
the mind corresponds to a fact in the world – specifically to a law of nature. “If the facts 
are rightly classed under the conception, it is because there is in the facts themselves 
something of which the conception is itself a copy” (Logic, VII: 296). 
 
5.3 The Ground of Induction 
 
As with ratiocination, Mill granted that there was a “fundamental principle, or general 
axiom, of induction,” a real proposition or “universal fact, which is our warrant for all 
inferences from experience,” namely the uniformity principle [UP]: “that the course of 
nature is uniform; that the universe is governed by general laws” (Logic, VII: 306–7). 
Mill claimed that our acceptance of UP is warranted by experience. “The truth that 
every fact which has a beginning has a cause, is coextensive with human experience” 
(Logic, VII: 325; cf. 306). Yet he also claimed that our experience of the uniformity of 
nature was not, itself, uniform. “The course of nature, in truth, is not only uniform, it is 
also infinitely various” (Logic, VII: 311). Hence, “[t]he general regularity [UP] results 
from the coexistence of partial regularities [the laws of nature]” (Logic, VII: 315). 
 
[T]he uniformity of the course of nature … is itself a complex fact, compounded of 
all the separate uniformities which exist in respect to single phenomena. These 
various uniformities, when ascertained by what is regarded as sufficient induction, we 
call in common parlance, Laws of Nature. (Logic, VII: 315) 
 
Consequently, our entitlement to UP is itself grounded on induction.3 
                                                
3 Mill’s commentators frequently note that he failed to address or even take notice of the sceptical problem 
of induction (e.g., Skorupski 1994: 100; Scarre 1998: 116). Some have sought to excuse this by pointing 
out that the problems of induction were not well known in Mill’s time. Scarre (1998: 117) for example, 
claims that “there was nowhere a lively interest in this sceptical problem of induction before the Green and 
Grose edition of Hume’s work in 1874 – and by that date Mill was dead.” Ducheyne and McCaskey (2014) 
claim that Hume’s association with induction was not made until the 1920’s with the publication of 
Keynes’s Treatise on Probability (1921). 
Whatever the case, it seems clear that Mill found the combined tools of empiricism and naturalism 
sufficient to solve the problem of induction. As we will see, Mill’s naturalism took for granted the primitive 
cogency of spontaneous induction, from which he used empiricism to build the more rigorous scientific 
induction. In view of reasons like this, Macleod (2014) argues that, rather than ignoring the problem of 
induction, Mill’s naturalism provides a Kantian solution to it by taking for granted the starting point of our 
common reasoning faculties. 
Additionally, Mill had little patience for the purely sceptical aspects of the problem of induction. For 
example, when considering the question of what evidence we have for UP, Mill engaged with the familiar 
sceptical argument that our experience that the course of nature was uniform is not good evidence that it 
will continue to be uniform, which is precisely what is required to establish the universal generalization UP, 
that the course of nature is, always, uniform. To this point Mill replied: 
 
Dr. Ward’s … strongest argument, is the familiar one of Reid, Stewart, and their followers – that 
whatever knowledge experience gives us of the past and present, it gives us none of the future. … I 
confess that I see no force whatever in this argument. Wherein does a future fact differ from a present 
or past fact, except in their merely momentary relation to the human beings at present in existence? 
The answer made by Priestley, in his Examination of Reid [1774], seems to me sufficient, viz. that 
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[T]his great generalization [UP] is itself founded on prior generalizations. … We 
should never have thought of affirming that all phenomena take place according to 
general laws, if we had not first arrived, in the case of a great multitude of 
phenomena, at some knowledge of the laws themselves; which could be done no 
otherwise than by induction. (Logic, VII: 307) 
 
As such, UP has the same epistemic grounding in experience and induction, and hence 
the same inert argumentative status, as any other real general claim. By using UP, “every 
induction may be thrown into the form of a syllogism” such that “the uniformity of the 
course of nature, will appear as the ultimate major premise of all inductions” (Logic, VII: 
308). Yet, like any other major premise its function is merely notational, rather than 
evidentiary or warranting. To all inductions, UP stands to their conclusions as any major 
premise in a syllogism: “not contributing at all to prove it, but being a necessary 
condition of its being proved” (Logic, VII: 308). 
 
5.4 ‘Spontaneous’ Inference: Mill’s Naturalization of Induction 
 
What then is the ultimate ground for induction in Mill’s logic? Here we find a third, and 
most trenchant, aspect of Mill’s logical naturalism. As already noted, Mill held that 
reasoning from particulars to particulars is the first and most natural way we ordinarily 
reason. Additionally, Mill held that the kinds of spontaneous induction human beings 
naturally engage in is primitively cogent. 
 
Assuredly, if induction by simple enumeration were an invalid process, no process 
grounded on it could be valid; just as no reliance could be placed on telescopes, if we 
could not trust our eyes. But though a valid process, it is a fallible one. (Logic, VII 7: 
567–8) 
 
Thus, at the very core of Mill’s logic one finds a naïve naturalism about the reliability of 
induction and the epistemic responsibility of its use as a means to knowledge. Though 
inferential, induction is a basic source of justification, and rather than provide it with 
some further ground, the task of the logician is to supply guidance norms for its proper 
use. 
Induction, reflectively practiced and rigorously articulated, e.g., by representing and 
testing our inferences syllogistically, and by using Mill’s methods to identify correct 
generalizations, constitutes a refinement of, indeed an improvement upon, our 
spontaneous and unreflective inferential proclivities. For example, Mill claimed, “Though 
not necessary for reasoning, general propositions are necessary to any considerable 
progress in reasoning” (Logic, VII: 199). Such refinements can improve our success in 
using induction, and hence the reliability of induction in particular applications. Yet, 
mere improvements they remain. “[T]he most scientific proceeding can be no more than 
an improved form of that which was primitively pursued by the human understanding, 
while undirected by science” (Logic, VII: 318). 
                                                                                                                                            
though we have had no experience of what is future, we have had abundant experience of what was 
future. (Logic, VII: 577) 
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Indeed the very processes of refinement, which Mill called “rigorous” or “scientific” 
induction, presupposes rather than establishes or bolsters the reliability of the initial, 
spontaneous practice. 
 
As, however, all rigorous processes of induction presuppose the general uniformity, 
our knowledge of the particular uniformities from which it was first inferred was not, 
of course, derived from rigorous induction, but from the loose and uncertain mode of 
induction per enumerationem simplicem; and the law of universal causation, being 
collected from results so obtained, cannot itself rest on any better foundation. It 
would seem, therefore, that induction per enumerationem simplicem not only is not 
necessarily an illicit logical process, but is in reality the only kind of induction 
possible; since the more elaborate process depends for its validity on a law, itself 
obtained in that inartificial mode. (Logic, VII: 567) 
 
Thus, rather than provide any further justification for induction, Mill was content to 
provide a natural history of it, seemingly because that was all the justification it needed, 
or at least because that was all the justification there was to be found. 
 
Many of the uniformities existing among phenomena are so constant, and so open to 
observation, as to force themselves upon involuntary recognition. … The first 
scientific inquirers assumed these and the like as known truths, and set out from them 
to discover others which were unknown … [as well as to revise] these spontaneous 
generalizations … when the progress of knowledge … showed their truth to be 
contingent on some circumstance not originally attended to. … [T]here is no logical 
fallacy in this mode of proceeding; … any other mode is rigorously impracticable: 
since it is impossible to frame any scientific method of induction, or test of the 
correctness of induction, unless on the hypothesis that some inductions deserving of 
reliance have already been made. (Logic, VII: 318–9) 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
6.1 Summary 
 
In summary, Mill’s logic concerns human reasoning insofar as it is an inferential path to 
knowledge, and seeks to provide reasoners with guidance norms for inferential 
knowledge. As an empiricist, Mill held that all our knowledge is acquired experientially 
and hence, in the first instance, is of concrete particulars. Since its original inputs are 
particular claims, the primary form of reasoning is from particulars to particulars. This 
kind of analogical reasoning becomes properly inductive when our extrapolation of 
properties from premise to conclusion conforms to an actual regularity in nature. When 
this occurs, we may infer not only to a particular but also to a generalization (i.e., to the 
regularity), and it is by this method that all real general propositions are properly inferred. 
The reliability of our inductions may be improved when we explicitly formulate the 
generalizations our inferences rely upon, and undertake to identify the actual regularities 
at work in the world, the causal laws of nature, ensuring that the former are instances of 
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the latter. Ratiocination, or syllogistic logic, provides a mechanism to test our reasoning. 
When our reasoning conforms to a valid syllogistic form and the general premises are 
properly nomological we may be assured that our conclusions are soundly derived. Yet, 
none of the general premises of ratiocination, or the principles of deduction (the 
transitivity of coexistence) or induction (the uniformity of nature), have any 
argumentative (evidentiary or warranting) function. Rather, in every case they are 
themselves the product of induction and their justification is reliant on induction. As 
such, induction is free-standing as the basic source of inferential justification. Its 
primitive cogency is established naturalistically through our spontaneous tendency to rely 
on it and our successes when doing so. 
 
6.2 Mill’s Naturalism and Russell’s Regressive Method 
 
Fumerton has charged that: 
 
Where Mill is most original, he is often least plausible. His apparent endorsement of 
induction as the source of even elementary knowledge of arithmetic … truths, for 
example, isolates him even from his most staunch fellow empiricists. (Fumerton 
2009: 147) 
 
On the face of it, Mill’s empiricist and naturalist account of the structure and foundations 
of inference seems deeply at odds with the kind of account that would become prevalent 
in Anglo-American analytical philosophy. For example, in as much as Mill’s empiricism 
was embraced by the logical positivists concerning synthetic knowledge, his natrualized 
and empirical account of the nature and foundation of putatively a priori, analytic 
knowledge was soundly rejected in favor of a formalist, logicist approach of the sort 
afforded by the new logical calculus. Take arithmetic, for example. While Frege 
recognized that simple arithmetical theorems (e.g., 2+2=4) and laws (e.g., the 
associativity of addition) are “amply established by the countless applications made of 
them every day” (1980: 2), he claimed that empirical observations play no part in the 
proof of such claims, which are properly demonstrated via derivations from first 
principles, as in his own Grundgesetze (1893–1903). 
Similarly, in describing his early views on Mill’s logic, Russell wrote: “In spite of [a] 
strong bias towards empiricism, I could not believe that ‘two plus two equals four’ is an 
inductive generalization from experience” (1959: 11). Yet, in 1907 Russell voiced his 
regressive method for discovering the premises of mathematics. The paper begins with 
the recognition of a striking paradox: 
 
There is an apparent absurdity in proceeding, as one does in the logical theory of 
arithmetic, through many rather recondite propositions of symbolic logic, to the 
‘proof’ of such truisms as 2+2=4: for it is plain that the conclusion is more certain 
than the premises, and the supposed proof therefore seems futile. (Russell 1973: 272) 
 
The paradox lies in the fact that the logical axioms from which theorems such as the 
truism 2+2=4 are derived, while putatively supplying the logical bases for the theorem, 
are in fact accepted by us only because they produce the truism as a theorem. “[W]e 
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tend,” Russell (1973: 273-4) claimed, “to believe the [logical] premises because we can 
see that their consequences are true, instead of believing the consequences because we 
know the premises to be true.” That is to say, our acceptance of the truism is primary in 
the order of our reasons, and our acceptance of the axioms is explained by the fact that 
they generate as theorems the truisms we already and independently accept. 
Although I do not wish to claim that Russell’s views here were influenced by Mill’s – 
indeed their projects were quite different – Russell’s position bears an unmistakable 
resemblance to Mill’s naturalized, empirical account of our knowledge of arithmetical 
truths. For example, Russell wrote that, while we now accept 2+2=4 as obvious and 
might thereby use it as a reason to demonstrate that combining two pairs of sheep would 
yield four sheep, 
 
the proposition ‘2 sheep + 2 sheep = 4 sheep’ was probably known to shepherds 
thousands of years before the proposition 2+2=4 was discovered; and when 2+2=4 
was first discovered, it was probably inferred from the case of sheep and other 
concrete cases. (Russell 1973: 272) 
 
Not only does this account embrace Mill’s naturalization of the subject matter of 
arithmetic (the “gingerbread or pebble arithmetic” so derided by Frege (1980: viii) in the 
introduction to his Grundlagen (1884)) but it also accepts Mill’s naturalized and 
empiricist account of the epistemic foundations of arithmetic. We accept the general 
axioms of a system (arithmetic, in this case) because of a prior and independent 
acceptance of the particular instances which are logical consequences of the axioms. 
Finally, in view of the proceeding considerations, Russell proposed a picture of the 
function of derivation from logical premises that strikingly agrees with Mill’s view. In 
deriving the truths of arithmetic from logical first principles, Russell claimed, “But of 
course what we are really proving is not the truth of 2+2=4, but the fact that from our 
premises [i.e., the logical axioms] this truth can be deduced” (Russell 1973: 272). While 
Russell did not claim that the function of the derivation is to provide a check of our 
untutored arithmetical reasoning, his position does grant that the derivation of arithmetic 
from logic does not function epistemically or argumentatively, providing us with reason 
to accept arithmetical truths. Russell concluded that 
 
If the contentions of this paper have been sound, it follows that the usual 
mathematical method of laying down certain premises and proceeding to deduce their 
consequences, though it is the right method of exposition, does not, except in the 
more advanced portions, give the order of knowledge. (Russell 1973: 282) 
 
Rather than as an attempt to discover the epistemological foundations of mathematics, the 
project of Russell and Whitehead’s Principia (1910–1927) is better understood as a 
“rational reconstruction” of mathematics as a science – the exhibition of its logical 
structure through the discovery of a set of assumptions that would sufficiently support it. 
Rather than to provide mathematics with a foundation in logic that would make it more 
secure or certain than it had been previously, the expectation was that it would be better 
understood and less philosophically puzzling. While it is true, then, that Russell and Mill 
were up to very different things, it also seems true that Russell’s views about what Mill 
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was up to (i.e., about the epistemic structure of our knowledge of mathematics) accord 
rather strikingly with Mill’s own, at least as they are expressed in the 1907 “Regressive 
Method” paper. 
Mill’s interest in the System of Logic was to analyse and evaluate the order of our 
knowledge. His aim was to provide us with norms for the guidance of our thoughts. And, 
he recognized, perhaps better than any other in his time, that the content and structure of 
logical reasons need not, and typically do not, correspond to the content and structure of 
empirical reasons. Today such a view is commonplace: it is widely recognized that 
logical norms (e.g., consistency and deductive closure) are not fit as rational norms, and 
quite often they fail even to prescribe rational norms in any straightforward way. 
Moreover, it is the empirical reasons that constitute the actual bases for our beliefs: they 
explain why we hold the beliefs we do, and they are what is really at issue when it comes 
to changing minds. In providing a naturalized account of the subject matter and 
foundations of inference, Mill hoped to articulate the logic of our real reasons and our 
actual inferential practices. Viewed in this way, perhaps his system of logic is best 
approached and understood as a system of reasoning. 
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